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Standard models of competition predict that firms will sell less when competitors target their customers with 
advertising.  This is particularly true in mature markets with many competitors selling relatively 
undifferentiated products.  We present findings from a large-scale randomized field experiment that contrast 
sharply with this prediction.  The field experiment measures the impact of competitors’ advertising on sales 
at a private label retailer of apparel, home furnishings and sporting goods.  Surprisingly, for a substantial 
segment of customers the competitors’ advertisements increased sales at this retailer.  This is a robust effect, 
obtained through experimental manipulation and measuring actual purchases by large samples of randomly 
assigned customers.  The effect is also large with customers ordering over 4% more items in some categories 
in the Treatment condition (compared to the control).  We compare how these positive spillovers vary across 
product categories to illustrate the importance of product standards, customer learning, and switching costs.  
The findings have the potential to change our understanding of competition in mature markets.    
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1. Introduction 
We report the findings from a large scale field experiment to investigate the impact of advertising in a 
competitive market. The field experiment was conducted with the cooperation of a large national 
retailer that sells private label apparel, home furnishings and sporting goods.  Although we cannot 
reveal the identity of the retailer, for ease of exposition we will label it “Retail World”.  In the field 
experiment approximately 370,000 of Retail World’s past customers were randomly assigned
The field experiment takes advantage of a common direct-mail practice: sharing of customer 
information between competing retailers.  Sharing is often done on a reciprocal basis, so that firms 
exchange information for an equivalent number of customers.  Firms use this information to identify 
where to send direct mail advertising, and this provides a unique opportunity to design a field 
experiment to measure the impact of competitors’ advertising on a firm’s sales.  We measure this 
impact by comparing purchases at Retail World between the two experimental conditions using 20-
months of transactions.  This period encompasses the twelve month treatment period and eight 
subsequent months, and includes over one million orders and almost $100 million in Retail World 
revenue.   
 to two 
experimental conditions.  The 185,000 customers in the Treatment condition received over 1.1 million 
targeted direct mail advertisements from Retail World’s close competitors.  Most of these 
advertisements consisted of competing catalogs containing product information, prices and images for 
hundreds of products.  Customers in the Control condition did not receive these advertisements.   
Surprisingly, we find that for a substantial segment of customers the competitors’ advertisements 
increased sales at Retail World.  This effect is large and it is obtained through comparison of actual 
purchases by large samples of randomly assigned customers.  What makes the outcome particularly 
surprising is that the apparel, home furnishings and sporting goods categories are mature and 
comprised of many retailers selling relatively undifferentiated products.1
The size of the positive spillovers varied across customers.  The largest increase in Retail World sales was 
from customers who had not made a recent Retail World purchase. The effect also varied across product 
categories.  To explain these positive spillovers and the variation across both categories and customers 
  The maturity of the markets 
ensures that all customers are aware of the product categories.  Customers can easily search and 
purchase products at competing firms, customers do not have to learn how to use the products, and 
compatibility between products is generally not specific to a firm.  These are product categories in which 
we might expect the threat from competition to be particularly strong.  Yet, we find positive spillovers 
from the competitors’ advertising.   
                                                          
1 The US retail apparel market contributes almost 3% of the US gross domestic product.  In 2007 customers in the 
US purchased approximately 20.1 billion garments and 2.4 billion pairs of shoes, representing approximately $371 
billion in revenue (AAFA 2008).  Sales of apparel and shoes are particularly strong in catalog and Internet channels.  
The Direct Marketing Association (DMA 2006) reports that the apparel category has a higher volume of Internet 
and catalog orders than any other product category.  In 2006 approximately 32% of US adults ordered an item of 
apparel from a direct retailer (including 23% of males and 40% of females).  Moreover, fully 24% of the 100 largest 
catalog retailers sell apparel.  Not surprisingly, almost all major apparel retailers now use direct mail advertising 
and catalog and Internet channels to complement their traditional retail stores. 
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we will distinguish between the decision to make a purchase in a category, and the selection of which 
retailer to purchase from.  Competitors’ advertising may influence the first decision by priming 
customers to think about the category.   However, even though the need to purchase may have been 
primed by competitors’ advertising, some customers returned to Retail World to satisfy this need.   
The focus of the paper is on the choice of which retailer to purchase from.  In preliminary interviews for 
this research some customers described examples of products that they only buy from the Retail World 
because they have learned which sizes fit.  One customer described how he had mailed an outline of his 
foot to Retail World, which the company used to determine his appropriate size.  When he orders Retail 
World footwear he believes it will fit.  However, he also knows that sizing differs across brands and so he 
avoids buying footwear elsewhere.  A key feature of this example is the standardization of product sizes.  
While footwear sizes are standardized within Retail World’s (private label) brand, they are different 
from sizes at competing brands.2
Standardization in sizes does not extend to all categories.  For example, swimwear sizes are not 
standardized even within Retail World’s brand.  Customers may need a size 8 when purchasing one style 
of Retail World swimwear and a size 10 when purchasing another style.  As a result the fit of past 
swimwear purchases may not help predict the fit of a new swimsuit.  We will show that variation in how 
much customers learn about sizes from past purchases helps to explain where the impact from the 
competitors’ advertising was largest.    
  If sizes were standardized across all brands, this customer could use 
Retail World’s size information to also order from other retailers.   
While the customer interviews yielded useful initial insights, formally documenting these effects 
required that we construct measures of how much customers learn from past purchases.  Fortunately 
this market provides an ideal measure of customer learning: changes in customer return rates.   The 
main reason that customers return items is due to concerns about product fit.  We compare the 
response to the competitors’ advertising with the change in return rates between customers’ first and 
last orders in the category.  We find a clear relationship: categories with the larger decreases in return 
rates due to poor fit are the categories with the most positive treatment effects in the competitive 
advertising experiment.  Across the 35 largest categories, the pair-wise correlation between the Change 
in Return Rates and the response to the competitors’ advertising is -0.41 (the rank-order correlation is 
-0.50).  We interpret this as evidence that learning about product sizes created switching costs in favor 
of Retail World.  These switching costs led customers to purchase from Retail World, even though their 
need to purchase was primed by the competitors. 
Related Literature 
Spillover effects have often been studied using Feldman and Lynch’s (1988) accessibility-diagnosticity 
framework.  This theory predicts that “an earlier response will be used as a basis for another subsequent 
response if the former is accessible and if it is perceived to be more diagnostic than other accessible 
inputs” (at page 421).  In our application, products are associated through a network that includes both 
retail brands and categories.  A retail advertisement may activate the retail brand, a category need and 
in-turn competing retail brands.  This model has been used to explain both positive and negative 
spillovers among competing brands.  For example, Janakiraman, Sismeiro and Dutta (2009) develop an 
                                                          
2 Discrepancies in footwear and apparel sizes across brands are well-documented (see references on page 5). 
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empirical framework to investigate positive spillovers between competing brands in the pharmaceutical 
industry.  They find that customers’ quality beliefs about the first entrant can influence customers’ prior 
beliefs about the quality of later entrants, but only if the products are similar.  They do not find any 
evidence of positive spillovers through advertising.  In particular, physicians do not appear to use 
detailing activities for one drug to form quality perceptions of competing drugs.    
Examples of positive advertising spillovers have been established in the context of umbrella brands 
(among non-competing brands).  For example, Balachander and Ghose (2003) show that these positive 
spillovers may not only project from the parent brand to the brand extension, but that reciprocal 
spillovers may also operate in the opposite direction (see also Morrin 1999).    
Negative spillovers among competing brands have also been documented.  Roehm and Tybout (2006, 
2009) demonstrate how a product scandal may spillover from a brand like Vioxx, which was recalled due 
to safety concerns, to damage a competing brand like Celebrex.  Analogously, Dark and Richie (2007) 
illustrate how deceptive advertising can have negative consequences for firms who are unrelated to the 
original deception.  Our findings contribute to our understanding of spillovers by documenting both the 
existence of positive advertising spillovers between competing brands, and highlighting the moderating 
role of consumer switching costs. 
Our findings also contribute to an extensive literature establishing the existence of state dependencies 
(consumer loyalty) in consumer choice (Dubé, Hitsch, Rossi and Vitorino 2008; Erdem 1996; Keane 1997; 
and Seetharaman, Ainslie and Chintagunta 1999).  Switching costs represent an important potential 
source of state dependence.  The earliest papers in the switching cost literature assumed that switching 
costs were exogenous and common across firms.  Under these conditions switching costs tend to reduce 
competition and increase profits in equilibrium (Klemperer 1987).  More recently it has been recognized 
that switching costs may be endogenous.  For example, Bergemann and Välimäki (1996) endogenize 
switching costs in a multi-armed bandit problem in which buyers learn about product quality through 
experience.  If firms can control the level of switching costs we might expect that they would prefer to 
increase them in order to dampen competition.  However, the literature often predicts the opposite 
result.  Anticipation that high switching costs leads will lead to higher second-period profits induces 
firms to compete aggressively in the first period.  If the resulting price competition erodes profits, then 
firms may reduce switching costs to dampen first-period competition (see for example Caminal and 
Matutes 1990, Marinoso 2001, Bouckaert and Hans Degryse 2004, and Cabral and Villas-Boas 2005).   
These distinct goals of “investing” to capture sticky customers and “harvesting” the surplus from them 
once captured makes it difficult to predict whether the presence of switching costs will increase or 
decrease the intensity of competition.  This has led to recent empirical research evaluating the 
contrasting predictions.  Dubé, Hitsch and Rossi (2009) provide a prominent recent example.  They study 
the refrigerated orange juice and margarine categories and report that the presence of switching costs 
can act to amplify the intensity of competition in these grocery markets.  Their study focuses on price 
competition among heterogenous firms and they find that intermediate levels of switching costs may 
lead to lower prices.  When switching costs are much larger, their numerical simulations show that 
prices can rise as competition is dampened.   
Our findings complement these results by extending our understanding of how switching costs impact 
competitive intensity.  The standard result in this context is that large switching costs create lock-in that 
insulates customers from competitors’ actions.  The surprise in our findings is that in the presence of 
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switching costs competitors’ actions can generate positive spillovers that are large enough to outweigh 
competitive substitution.   Moreover, the extant switching cost literature has largely focused on price 
competition in markets for low-involvement fast-moving consumer goods, while we focus on 
competitive advertising in markets for higher-priced consumer durables.     
Dubé, Hitsch and Rossi (2009) attribute the state dependence in their study to a “psychological” 
switching cost, including cognitive dissonance in which customers change their preferences to 
rationalize previous choices.  Elsewhere the literature has distinguished between “transaction costs” 
and “learning costs.”  Examples of transaction costs include the cost of travelling to different gasoline 
stations or the time required to evaluate alternative suppliers and establish new account information.  
Learning costs describe the time and effort customers incur when learning how to use a new product 
(Erdem and Keane 1996, Ackerberg 2003, Crawford and Shum 2005).  Nilssen (1992) argues that this 
distinction is important.  He predicts that because learning costs are only incurred once for each supplier 
while transaction costs are incurred every time a customer switches, transaction costs lead to a larger 
increase in equilibrium prices and contribute to a greater loss of social welfare.  
The switching costs we identify in this paper do not fit neatly into either category.  Because customers 
must learn about product fit when purchasing from a retailer they exhibit some of the characteristics of 
a learning cost.  However, the cost to the customer also includes the risk of purchasing the wrong item, 
which is not the time and effort typically associated with learning.  If customers purchase items that do 
not fit they may incur a transaction cost to return an item.   
The findings provide support for recent work on the role that the Internet plays in lowering search costs. 
The fit of apparel products is a feature that is not easy for customers to search on over the Internet.  To 
evaluate fit customers must actually try the products on, either by visiting a store or ordering the items.  
Lal and Sarvary (1999) study markets in which customers can search for some product features using the 
Internet, but other product features require a physical inspection.3
The results in this paper can also be compared with the literature on product standards, which has 
demonstrated that competition can result in the adoption or preservation of socially inefficient 
standards  (see for example Farrell and Saloner 1985 and 1986; Katz and Shapiro 1985 and 1994; and 
Bessen and Farrell 1994).  While the body of theoretical work is now very extensive, there has been 
recent recognition that there is need for more empirical work on this topic (Suarez 2005; Birke 2009).  
Much of the literature has focused on the role of network effects in technology markets (see for 
example Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 1999; Basu, Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Sun, Xie and Cao 2004; Dubé, 
Hitsch and Chintagunta 2010; and Wang and Xie 2011).  Our findings can be interpreted as evidence that 
competition can lead to the adoption of socially inefficient standards even in non-technology markets 
and without the presence of strong network effects.  There have been many large-scale studies 
  They show that the presence of non-
digital product features can increase customer loyalty, as customers may not risk physically searching for 
products with better non-digital attributes, and instead, remain with the product that they are familiar 
with.  This is essentially the same intuition that we use in this paper to explain why customers are more 
loyal to Retail World in categories in which they must learn about product sizes. 
                                                          
3 Related work has attributed higher price sensitivity on the Internet to the lower cost of search.  Examples include 
evidence that airline demand is more sensitive to price changes in the Internet channel than in the traditional 
channel (Granados, Gupta and Kauffman 2012); and that apparel and home furnishing demand is more sensitive to 
charging sales tax on the Internet channel than in the catalog channel (Anderson, Fong, Simester and Tucker 2010).   
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documenting the variation in sizes across US apparel brands.  For example, Kinley (2005) sent a team of 
research assistants into 20 retail stores in a Southwestern city to measure the sizes of 1,011 pairs of 
pants.  They report large discrepancies across brands at every size level.4
The variation in apparel sizes survives despite numerous attempts to introduce standard sizes.  As early 
as 1969 the International Standards Organization proposed a very flexible system of standard apparel 
sizes that promised to greatly reduce customer confusion.  Other researchers have also proposed 
standard sizing systems (see for example Ashdown 1998; Caldwell 1996; Chun-Yoon and Jasper 1996; 
and Tamburrino 1992).  However, none of these sizing systems have been widely adopted (Kinley 2005).  
Even though apparel retailers could in principle standardize the sizes of their products they choose not 
to do so.   Industry commentators have attributed this reluctance to adopt a common standard to a 
desire among retailers to make it more difficult for customers to switch stores:
   
5
“Retailers and clothing makers thrive on sizing confusion.  Consumers who find a brand that 
fits are likely to stick with it, and a standard sizing system would encourage them to visit 
other stores.”  
  
Barbaro (2006 at page 1) 
A similar explanation is offered by Ellison and Ellison (2009) to explain why firms may want to obfuscate, 
in order to make it difficult for customers to compare prices.  In their setting firms forgo standardization 
to obstruct price search by customers, resulting in less competition (see also Bergen, Dutta and Shugan 
1996; and Gaudel and Sugden 2012).  Our findings provide evidence that in apparel markets the absence 
of standardization yields a similar outcome by making it more difficult for customers to switch to 
competing retailers. 
Structure of the Paper 
The paper proceeds in Section 2 with a detailed description of the study design.  We present aggregate 
results in Section 3 and then in Section 4 investigate the role of customer loyalty and product 
standardization.  The paper concludes in Section 5 with a review of the findings. 
2. Study Design 
The study was conducted with the cooperation of a medium-sized retailer (”Retail World”) that sells 
apparel, home furnishings and sporting goods.  With few exceptions, all of the products sold by this 
retailer are private label products carrying the firm’s own brand.6
                                                          
4 Delk and Cassill (1989), Workman (1991), Tamburrino (1992) and Workman and Lentz (2000) report similar 
findings.   
  Although many competitors sell 
5 The failure to adopt standard sizing systems is also sometimes attributed to “customer vanity”.  Manufacturers of 
more expensive clothing reportedly tend to increase the physical dimensions to satisfy customers who want to 
believe that they fit a smaller size.  There is evidence to support these claims; Kiley (2005) Sieben and Chen-Yu 
(1992) both report that more expensive products tend to have larger dimensions at a given size.   
6 Private label apparel represents over 40% of all apparel sales (Cohen 2009) and up to 50% of sales in department 
stores (Trefis Group 2010).  For many large retailers such as The Gap, J Crew, and Abercrombie and Fitch private 
label sales represent almost all of their sales.  Moreover, direct mail advertising is one of the largest forms of 
advertising; in 2010 direct mail advertising spending increased 3.1% to $45.2 billion (Levey 2011).  This compares 
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similar products, Retail World’s private label products are exclusively available from its own catalog, 
Internet and retail store channels.  The products are moderately priced ($48 on average) and past 
customers return to purchase relatively frequently (1.2 orders containing on average 2.4 items per year).  
Competitive Advertising 
Like many retailers in this market, Retail World regularly participates in competitive advertising 
programs that facilitate acquisition of prospective customers.  Retailers who decide to join one of these 
programs agree to provide contact information (name and mailing address) and purchase histories of 
past customers.  In return for providing data, a participating firm has access to customer information 
from other firms that join the program.  A third-party acts as a clearinghouse and limits information flow 
between the firms.  Participating firms do not generally have direct access to the names and purchase 
histories of other firms’ customers.  Instead, each firm makes a request for customers with a specific 
demographic profile and transaction history.  Three examples of actual mailing requests from the 
competitive advertising event that we study are summarized in Table A1 in the appendix (the examples 
are disguised to protect confidentiality). 
In the competitive advertising event that we study a total of 64 of the Retail World’s competitors mailed 
at least one advertising piece to Retail World customers across a period of approximately 12-months 
(May 1, 2006 through May 14, 2007).  Many of these competitors mailed multiple advertising pieces, 
and so a total of 217 different competitive advertising pieces were sent to the Retail World customers.  
Because the companies in some cases requested two different samples for the same advertising piece 
(e.g. 10,000 female buyers and 15,000 male buyers), the total number of requests exceeded the number 
of mailings.  In particular, there were 301 requests spread across the 217 advertising pieces.   
Design of Field Experiment 
We use a field experiment to investigate how participation in this event affected purchases from Retail 
World.  Prior to the start of the field experiment
To confirm that the allocation of customers to the two conditions was random we compared historical 
purchases from Retail World by the two samples.  In particular, we compared the average units 
purchased and average revenue prior to the start of the competitive advertising event.  If the 
assignment were truly random, we should not observe any systematic differences in historical sales 
 Retail World selected a sample of almost 370,000 
customers and then randomly assigned them to Treatment and Control conditions.  The randomization 
was done using the customers’ account numbers, which ensured that the randomization was done at a 
customer level (rather than across geographic regions or some other aggregate level).  The 
randomization resulted in a Treatment sample of 184,455 customers and a Control sample of 184,625 
customers.  All of these customers had made at least one purchase from Retail World in the 12-months 
before the start of the competitive advertising event.  Customers in the Treatment condition were 
included in the cooperative mailing pool given to the third party.  The customers in the Control condition 
were withheld from this pool of names.    
                                                                                                                                                                                           
with $56 billion spent on television advertising and just $27.7 billion on digital (Internet) advertising. Despite these 
expenditure levels, direct mail has received much less attention in the literature than digital advertising. 
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between the two samples. Reassuringly, none of the differences are significant despite the large sample 
sizes (we report these historical comparisons in Table 1 in the next section).   
Customers in the Treatment and Control conditions both continued to receive catalogs from Retail 
World.  Retail World used the same mailing policy for all customers irrespective of the experimental 
condition they were in.  It is also helpful to note that Retail World maintains a single price policy.  
Although the price of an item may vary over time, all customers purchasing that item at any point in 
time pay the same price.  This policy ensures that there were no differences in the prices that customers 
paid across the two experimental conditions.   
The opportunity to compare exogenously manipulated treatment and control groups is an important 
characteristic of the study that overcomes a problem that has plagued many previous studies of 
advertising.  In general advertising decisions are endogenous, and are often at least partly determined 
by expectations about sales levels.  As a result, simply measuring the level of association between 
advertising sales does not allow us to draw causal inferences about how advertising affects sales 
(Bagwell 2007).  It is generally even more difficult to identify how sales are affected by competitors’ 
advertising.  In most cases it is not possible to distinguish which customers are targeted by competitors, 
or to account for the factors that may have contributed to the targeting decisions.   
The Treatment 
In total approximately 1.15 million competitive mailing pieces were sent to the 184,455 customers in 
our sample, or approximately 6.23 competitive mailing pieces per customer.  We do not know which 
customers received which competitor’s mailing.  However, we do know the criteria that competitors 
used to request customers for each mailing.  We summarize these criteria in Table A2, which is located 
in the appendix.  The most common criteria were the recency of customers’ last purchases and the 
amount spent on those purchases.  Of the 301 requests, 87% included a recency criterion, while 80% 
included an “amount spent” criterion. Other common criteria included the type of catalog that 
customers had purchased from (50% of requests), the product category (43%), the customer’s gender 
(37%) and the zip code they lived in (17%).7
We can also compare our eligibility estimates with measures describing customers’ actual historical 
purchases from Retail World.  These results are reported in Table A3 of the Appendix.  They reveal a 
clear pattern: the competitors tended to request Retail World’s most valuable customers.  These include 
customers who had ordered more recently, more frequently and had placed larger orders with Retail 
World.   
 
We caution that we cannot use the mailing requests to construct probabilities that an individual 
customer received a specific competitive mailing.  Because many of the requests included a criteria that 
previously used customers were excluded (see the examples in Table A1), the actual mailing samples 
were not independent across the mailing efforts.  In general, this “no previously used customers” 
criteria will reduce the heterogeneity in actual mailing frequencies across customers.  Because the 
eligibility for the competitive mailings varied according to customers’ purchasing histories, we also need 
                                                          
7 The frequency of customers’ purchases was not an available selection criterion. 
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to be careful when evaluating how the results of the experiment varied according to customer 
characteristics.  If we observe a larger effect among customers who were eligible to receive more 
mailings then we cannot easily distinguish whether it was the customer characteristics that amplified 
the effect or the increase in the number of competitive mailings that these customers received.8
3. Initial Results 
   
Retail World did not receive data describing which of its customers made purchases from any of the 
competing firms.  However, it does maintain complete records of customers’ purchases of its own 
products.  We compare purchases made by customers in the two experimental conditions.  We compare 
purchases over a period of approximately 20-months (the “Measurement Period”).  This period starts 
from the first mailing date in the competitive advertising event (May 1, 2006) through December 28, 
2007 (almost eight months after the event finished on May 14, 2007). The average units purchased and 
average revenue in the two conditions are reported in Table 1.   
Table 1 about here 
Customers in the Treatment condition purchased 7.67 units, compared to 7.66 units in the Control 
condition.  The difference in these averages (0.015) is not significant.  There is also no significant 
difference in the average revenue per customer.  To help interpret this null result it is helpful to ask how 
big the difference in these averages would need to be in order for the difference to be statistically 
significant.  The standard error of the difference in the two sample means are $1.5865 (revenue) and 
0.0475 (units).  Therefore, given the sample means for the control condition, the difference in the 
means would need to be equal $3.11 (revenue) and 0.09 (units) to be significantly different.   
From a practical perspective this result implies that on average there is no cost to the firm in allowing its 
competitors to advertise to its customers, even when these competitors are able to select the most 
valuable customers.  We were surprised by this result.  Given the number of competitors, maturity of 
the market, and relatively low levels of differentiation between products, we anticipated that allowing 
competitors to advertise to Retail World’s customers would result in substitution of demand from Retail 
World to the competitor.  The findings in Table 1 do not support this prediction.  If anything, the 
differences in average sales are in the opposite direction.   
One possible interpretation of this null overall result is that customers have self-selected to their 
favorite firms, and their demand is not sensitive to the actions of the competing firms.  However, we will 
demonstrate that we should not conclude from this null overall result that the competitors’ advertising 
did not have any effect on Retail World’s sales.  Instead we will show that the null result is caused by 
aggregating positive effects in some categories with negative effects in others.   The remainder of the 
                                                          
8 We also note that because eligibility for the competitive mailings was primarily determined by historical 
purchasing history, eligibility changed as customers purchased.  For example, consider a mailing that was only sent 
to customers who had purchased within the last 3-months.  At the start of the event a customer may not have 
been eligible for this mailing.  However, if this customer purchased from Retail World then the customers would 
have become eligible immediately after that purchase.   
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paper explores these interactions by comparing how the outcome varied across different customers and 
product categories.  We begin by comparing the outcome for different segments of customers. 
Time Since Last Purchase 
One factor that may contribute to how customers respond to advertising is the extent to which their 
demand is already depleted.  We might expect that customers who have just purchased may have 
satiated their demand, making it less likely they will react to an advertisement.  To investigate this 
possibility we use the timing of customers’ purchases prior to the start of the competitive mailing to 
measure whether the effect of competitive advertising is influenced by the time since a customer’s prior 
purchase.  
Recall that all of the customers in the study had made at least one purchase from Retail World in the 
twelve months before the start of the field experiment.  We grouped customers into three mutually 
exclusive segments by dividing these twelve months into three time periods.  The first segment includes 
customers who had made a purchase from Retail World within four-months of the start of the event.  
Customers in the second segment had made their most recent purchase between four and eight months 
prior to the start of the event.  Customers in the third segment had made their most recent purchase 
between eight and twelve months of the start of the event.  For each segment we then calculated the 
difference between the Treatment and Control conditions in average sales across the twenty-month 
Measurement Period.  The findings are summarized in Table 2 (where we also report the historical sales 
comparisons for these three segments).     
Table 2 about here 
The competitive advertising did not have a significant effect on sales at Retail World among customers 
who had recently purchased from that firm.  However, among customers whose prior purchases were 
the least recent (Segment 3), competitive advertising led to a significant increase in sales at Retail 
World.  This is the opposite of what we would expect if the competitive advertising led solely to 
substitution to the competitors.   
It is helpful to remember factors that cannot explain the difference in sales for Segment 3.  We can rule 
out the possibility that the interaction between the response to the competitive mailing and the timing 
of customers’ prior purchases reflects heterogeneity in the treatment itself.  As we reported in Table 1, 
the competitors tended to request customers who had purchased more recently.  In particular, 
customers in Segment 3 were eligible to receive an average of just 8.2 competitive mailings.  This is 
much lower than the averages of 50.0 and 28.3 eligible requests in Segments 1 and 2 (respectively).  It 
seems implausible that the positive effects in Segment 3 (higher orders, items, units and revenue) can 
be attributed to a smaller experimental treatment.  
The difference in units sold in Segment 3 also cannot be explained by differences in the customers 
themselves.  Our analysis compares customers in the two experimental conditions and random 
assignment ensures that there are no systematic differences between customers in the two conditions.  
Note that the findings in Table 2 confirm that for all three segments the historical sales to customers in 
the Treatment and Control conditions were not significantly different.  Given the very large sample sizes 
this confirms that the random assignment of customers to the Treatment and Control conditions was 
performed correctly.   
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In Segment 3 we do observe slightly (although not significantly) higher sales in the Treatment condition 
than in the Control condition.  To confirm that customer differences do not explain the differences 
during the Measurement Period we can use a multivariate approach to control for any historical 
differences between the customers.  This also provides an opportunity to investigate other factors that 
may have contributed to the results.   Our multivariate analysis is conducted in two parts.  In the first 
part we measure purchases by each customer across all categories, while in the second part we measure 
purchases by each customer in each category.  
Customer-Level Analysis 
The dependent variable in this first part of the analysis measures the number of units that customer i 
purchased during the Measurement Period.  Because Units Purchasedi is a “count” variable, we estimate 
a negative binomial model.   To estimate the impact of the timing of a customer’s prior purchase in the 
category we calculate Recencyi, which is defined as the number of days (in hundreds) since a customer’s 
last purchase (prior to the treatment).  We then interact Recencyi with a binary variable identifying 
customers in the treatment condition (Treatmenti).  We also estimate a separate specification in which 
we group customers into Segments 1, 2 and 3 (as defined earlier) and estimate the impact of the 
treatment separately for these three segments.   
As additional controls we considered what other factors might be correlated with the timing of 
customer’s prior purchases.  There are two obvious candidates.  First, we would expect the time since a 
customer’s last purchase in the category to be affected by how frequently the customer purchases.  We 
measure this by simply counting the number of prior units purchased (Prior Unitsi).  Notice that this also 
explicitly controls for any differences in the historical units purchased between the Treatment and 
Control conditions.  Second, we might expect that the timing of customers’ last purchase may be 
affected by the seasonality in their purchasing patterns.  Recall that the treatment started on May 1 and 
so customers who only purchase at Christmas will tend to have a different Recencyi measure than 
customers who purchase at other times of this year.9
To ensure that the relationship between the experimental treatment and the timing of customers’ prior 
category purchases (Recencyi) is not due to either the frequency with which customers purchase or the 
seasonality of their purchases, we include interactions between the treatment and these controls in our 
model specification.  In particular, we estimate the following model: 
  To control for the impact of this seasonality we 
calculated the percentages of a customer’s (pre-treatment) purchases that are made in each calendar 
month (Month 1, …, Month 12).   
 
𝜆𝑖 = β1Treatmenti + β2Treatmenti ∗ Recencyi + β3Treatmenti ∗ Prior Category Unitsi+ � φmTreatmenti ∗ Month mi11
m=1
+ 𝐁𝐗 
                                                          
9 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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The vector X contains a complete set of control variables, including main effects for Recencyi,, Prior 
Unitsi,, and the Month mi  variables.  We also include main effects for the demographic variables.10
     
  The 
coefficient of interest is β2.  This measures how the effect of the treatment varies according to the 
timing of the customer’s most recent prior purchase.  The findings are reported in Table 3 (to 
demonstrate robustness we also include a base model without covariates).  For ease of exposition we do 
not report the coefficients for our monthly control variables (seasonality) or their interaction with the 
treatment.   
Table 3 about here 
 
The results confirm that competitive advertising led to a large increase in purchases from Retail World 
among customers whose last purchases in the category were less recent.  A 100-day increase in the time 
since a customer’s last purchase is associated with a 1.61% increase in the impact of the competitive 
advertising.  Moreover, we now see that the significant impact of the competitive advertising extends 
beyond Segment 3.  For customers in Segment 1 (who had last purchased within 4-months of the start 
of the test) the competitive advertising is associated with a 2.53% increase in unit sales, which is not 
statistically significant.  For Segments 2 and 3 the estimated increases in unit sales are 3.75% and 7.12% 
(respectively).  The effects for these last two segments are both statistically significant (p<0.05). 
Customer x Category-Level Analysis 
Notice that the timing of a customer’s last purchase will generally vary across categories.  While a 
customer may have purchased a pair of pants recently, they may not have purchased footwear.  While 
customers may have depleted their demand for one category (pants), they may not have depleted 
demand for other product categories (footwear).  To investigate these possibilities we re-analyzed sales 
at the category level.   
A category is defined using two dimensions: product type (e.g. footwear, tops, swimwear, pants) and 
customer gender (for items where gender is relevant).  We focus on the 35 largest categories, which 
represent 81% of all purchases (the remaining purchases are spread across approximately 200 other 
categories).  We stack the data so that for each customer we obtain 35 observations, one for each 
category.  The dependent variable measures the number of units that customer i purchased from 
category c during the test period.  To account for category differences we estimate a quasi-maximum 
likelihood (QML) Poisson model with (conditional) category fixed effects (Wooldridge 1999). This 
estimator is consistent under very general conditions.  For example, in contrast to the regular Poisson 
model the estimator is consistent even if there is over-dispersion or under-dispersion in the latent 
variable model. Moreover, the robust variance-covariance matrix described by Wooldridge (1999) allows 
for deviations from the Poisson distribution together with arbitrary category-level fixed effects.  
                                                          
10 We are missing demographic observations for a small number of customers.  For these observations we set the 
demographic variables at zero and identify the missing data using binary flags (that we also include as controls).  
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To estimate the impact of the timing of a customer’s prior purchase in a category we calculate Category 
Recencyi,c, which is defined as the number of days (in hundreds) since a customer’s last purchase in the 
category (prior to the treatment).  We then estimate the QML Poisson model including Category 
Recency both as a main effect and interacted with the binary Treatment flag.  As additional controls we 
measure the number of prior units purchased at the category level (Prior Category Unitsi,c).  We also 
again control for the impact of seasonality and estimate the following system of independent variables: 
 
𝜆𝑖,𝑐 = β1Treatmenti + β2Treatmenti ∗ Category Recencyi,c + β3Treatmenti ∗ Prior Category Unitsi,c+ � φmTreatmenti ∗ Month mi12
m=2
+ 𝐁𝐗 
The vector X again contains a complete set of control variables, including main effects for the 
demographic variables.  Recall also that the model explicitly controls for arbitrary category-level 
differences using (conditional) category fixed effects.  The coefficient of interest is β2.  This measures 
how the effect of the treatment varies according to the timing of the customer’s most recent prior 
purchase in that category.  In Table 4 we report findings when using Category Recency (Model 1) and 
when using a log transformation of Category Recency (Model 2).  We also report a model in which we 
include both Category Recency and overall Recency both as main effects and interacted with the 
Treatment variable (Model 3).  The standard errors are clustered by category to account for any 
correlation in the errors across customers within the category. 
Recall that in our prior analysis every customer had made a prior purchase from the firm, and so 
Recencyi is well-defined when we calculate it at the aggregate level.  However, not all customers have a 
prior purchase in all 35 categories.  Because the behavior of these customers does not inform us about 
how the timing of prior category purchases influenced the outcome, when estimating the impact of 
Category Recency we restrict attention to observations in which customers have made a purchase in the 
category.  In later analysis (Section 4) we use a different approach that relaxes this restriction.   
Table 4 about here 
The findings in Table 4 replicate the earlier results.  The competitive advertising led to a larger increase 
in purchases from Retail World among customers whose last purchases in the category were less recent.  
In Model 1 we see that a 100 day increase in the time since a customer’s last purchase in the category is 
associated with a 0.33% increase in the response (in that category) to the competitors’ advertising. 
Interestingly, in Model 3 where we include Category Recency  and overall Recency, both interactions are 
significant. This indicates that demand depletion is not completely specific to a category.  It appears that 
among customer who have purchased recently, it is more difficult to prompt an additional purchase, 
even in categories they have not recently purchased.  For example, a recent purchase of pants appears 
to make it more difficult to prompt an additional purchase of footwear (for at least some customers).  
This could be explained by these customers having a budget constraint for apparel generally, rather than 
separate constraints for footwear and pants.    
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Our calculation of the time since a customer’s last category purchase does not account for variation in 
the inter-purchase intervals between categories.  However, there is considerable variation across 
categories in the typical interval between purchases, which may also influence whether a customer’s 
demand for products in a category is depleted.  For example, while pants have an average inter-
purchase interval of approximately eighteen months, the average inter-purchase interval for underwear 
is closer to three years.  Therefore, if the last purchase occurred two years ago, this may indicate that a 
purchase of pants is overdue, but customers are not yet ready to purchase underwear.   To investigate 
this possibility we calculated the average inter-purchase interval for each category.  We then re-
analyzed the time since a customer’s last purchase by re-scaling the time since a customer’s last 
category purchase according to the number of inter-purchase intervals.  The results are also reported in 
Table 4 (Models 4 and 5).   
We report two specifications.  First, we treat the number of (category) inter-purchase intervals since a 
customer’s last purchase in the category as a continuous measure (Intervals Since Last Purchasei,c) and 
interact this continuous measure with the treatment (Model 4).  For every additional inter-purchase 
interval since a customer’s last category purchase the impact of the competitive advertising increased by 
an average of 2.01%.  Second, in the same way that we grouped customers into segments according to 
the timing of their last purchases, we can also group them according to the category inter-purchase 
intervals since their last purchase.  We compare customers whose purchases were less recent with 
benchmark customers whose previous purchases were most recent.11
Summary 
  In particular, our benchmark 
includes customers who made a prior purchase within 1 inter-purchase interval of the start of the 
treatment.  If a customer’s last category purchase was between 1 and 2 inter-purchase intervals prior to 
the start of the treatment, then the impact of the competitive advertising was 2.86% higher than the 
benchmark customers.  If their last category purchase was over 2 inter-purchase intervals ago, the effect 
increased by 5.85% compared to the benchmark customers. 
An initial comparison of purchases during the Measurement Period indicates that there is no significant 
difference in the outcomes in the Treatment and Control condition.  However, further investigation 
reveals that we do observe a significant difference in the outcomes for customers who had not 
purchased recently.  We illustrate this interaction using a variety of approaches, including both the time 
since a customer made any purchase from the firm, and the timing of purchases in specific categories.  
Our analysis includes controls for a variety of customer differences, together with arbitrary category-
level effects.    
We interpret the interaction between the timing of a customer’s last purchase and the response to the 
competitive mailing as evidence of demand depletion.  Satiation among customers who had recently 
purchased appears to have muted their reaction to the competitors’ advertising, limiting any increase in 
primary demand.  However, we do not have data describing purchases from competing firms and so we 
cannot directly measure the change in primary demand.    
                                                          
11 Notice that the treatment effect for these benchmark customers can be calculated from the Treatment 
coefficient (-0.99%), but must also be conditioned on the number of prior category units that the customer has 
purchased.  
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Instead, we focus on understanding why customers responded to the competitors’ advertising by 
purchasing from Retail World rather than the competitors.  We turn to this issue in the next section 
where we explore how the impact of the competitive advertising varied across different product 
categories.   
4. Switching Costs and Customer Learning 
As we discussed in the Introduction, we interviewed a sample of Retail World’s customers as 
background research for this study. An issue that arose frequently in these interviews was the role of 
product sizes.  Some customers described examples of products that they only buy from Retail World 
because they have learned which sizes fit them.  They expressed reluctance to buy from competitors 
because they are less certain about fit.  A key feature of this argument is the specificity of product fit.  
For example, while footwear sizes are standardized within the Retail World (private label) brand, sizes 
typically vary across brands.  If the sizes of footwear were standardized across brands customers could 
use Retail World’s size information to also order products from other firms.  Similarly, if there is no 
standardization in sizes, either because sizes are unimportant (e.g. backpacks), or because fit varies 
across products even within a firm (e.g. swimwear), then standardization will again not contribute to 
customer loyalty.     
To evaluate the extent to which customers learn standardized sizes over time we constructed measures 
of the change in product return rates over time.  In particular, comparing the return rate on a 
customer’s first purchase in a category and that customer’s most recent purchase may provide a 
measure of learning about product fit.  The more learning that occurs the larger the expected reduction 
in return rates.   
To obtain reliable estimates of the return rates we used the complete purchase histories for a sample of 
3,634,695 Retail World customers.12  Their purchase histories include a total of over 93 million 
purchases representing over $3.6 billion in revenue.    The historical data for these customers describes 
when a customer returns an item and the reason for the return.  In particular, the sample includes a 
total of over 15.1 million returns.  For approximately 78% of these returns we have a variable describing 
the reason that the item was returned.13
                                                          
12 We obtain similar results if we calculate return rates using historical transactions by the 369,080 customers in 
the study.  However, the additional sample size yields more precise estimates of the return rates. 
  In Table 5 we list each of the return reasons and describe the 
frequency with which they appear.  The most common reason that items are returned is that they are 
the wrong size, which contributes approximately half (46.6%) of all reasons for returns.  The next most 
frequent reason is that the customer did not like the item when it arrived, generally because they did 
not like the color, material or styling.  Defects contribute only a small portion of the returns. 
13 The firm has used the same set of explanations for why items are returned throughout the transaction history.  
Approximately half of the returns with missing reasons occur before February 23, 1996, which was the first date 
that the firm started recording reasons for returns.  After this date they occur with slightly diminishing frequency 
over time.  To ensure that the Return Trend is not affected by missing return reasons, when calculating the Return 
Trend for each reason we omit all observations for a customer in a category if a return on the first or last category 
order is not accompanied by a reason.    
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Table 5 about here 
There are some items for which we would expect more learning about product sizes than other items.  
These categories provide an opportunity to investigate our interpretation that the reduction in return 
rates provides a way to measure how much customers learn about product sizes.  First, we might expect 
that customers will learn less about the size of “Childrens” items versus other items.  Because childrens’ 
sizes change, experiences with the fit of past purchases may not provide as much information as the fit 
of future purchases in childrens’ product categories than in other product categories.  Second, there are 
many items that do not have sizes.  This includes non-apparel items (e.g. backpacks) and some apparel 
items for which “one size fits all” (e.g. scarves).   
In Figures 1 and 2 we report the average difference between a customer’s first purchase in a category 
and their last purchase in a category according to whether: (a) the item is in the Childrens’ category or 
not and (b) whether the items in the category have sizes or not.  The unit of observation is a customer in 
a category, and we use all of the observations for which the customer made at least two purchases in 
the category (so that we can calculate the change in the return rate).  We report the difference in return 
rates for each of the four return reasons.    
Figures 1 and 2 about here 
There are several findings of interest.  First, for categories without sizes there is essentially no change 
(0.06%) in the return rates due to size between a customer’s first and last category order.  Further 
investigation confirms that the first and last return rates due to size are essentially zero in these 
categories.  This is precisely what we would expect and offers reassurance that the return rate for sizes 
does not include returns for other reasons.  Second, for those categories with sizes we see a large 
reduction (-1.45%) in the return rate due to sizes between customers first and last orders.   This is 
consistent with our interpretation that customers learn about sizes as they place more orders in these 
categories.  Third, the reduction in the return rate due to sizes is considerably smaller for Childrens’ 
categories than for other categories (-0.88% versus -1.50%).  This is consistent with customers learning 
less about sizes from past purchases in Childrens’ categories than in other categories. 
The change in return rates for the other three return reasons are also interesting.  For these other 
return reasons the differences between categories with and without product sizes, and between 
Childrens’ and other categories are much smaller than we observe for returns due to size.  However, the 
sample sizes are very large and so even these smaller differences are statistically significant.  It appears 
that when a customer returns an item because of poor fit this is generally categorized accurately as a 
size-related return.  However, the larger reduction in returns on categories with sizes for these other 
three return reasons could indicate that some of the size returns spillover to these other return reasons.  
These attributions are not necessarily errors.  Notice that a customer who finds that an item does not fit 
could quite reasonably indicate that they do not like the item, or interpret the poor fit as a defect.  Any 
measurement errors that result from these spillovers will hinder (not help) validation of our prediction 
that the response to the competitive advertising event is associated with the change in the size return 
rate. 
Return rates due to defects and because customers do not like the items exhibit a slight increase in 
categories without sizes.  One possible explanation is that Retail World has a generous returns policy 
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and the increase in return rates in these two categories may reflect customers learning about this policy.  
If this explanation is correct then, in the absence of learning about sizes, we might expect return rates in 
every product category to be higher for the last purchase than for a customer’s first purchase.   
The Change in Return Rates and the Response to the Competitors’ Advertising 
Our analysis again focuses on the 35 largest product categories.  However, in this analysis we add an 
additional refinement to our definition of a category.  Preliminary investigation revealed that for some 
apparel items Retail World uses different “size types”’ within a category.   For example, women’s pants 
come in 3 different size types: 
• {S, M, L XL, XXL …}  
• {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, …} 
• 23”, 24”, 25”, 26”, 28”, 30”, 32”, 34”  
We would expect that learning would only occur within one of these narrow product categories.  For 
example, learning about {S, M, L XL, XXL …} sizes may not help customers learn about {1, 2, 4, 6, 8, …} 
sizes.  For this reason we use our separate sample of 3.6 million customers to identify the most common 
size type within each category and in our Size Learning analysis restrict attention to purchases and 
returns within this size type.14
To construct a category-level measure of the amount of learning about sizes in each category we 
calculated the difference in the return rate between a customer’s first and last purchase in each 
category and then averaged across customers.  Because there is heterogeneity in the number of orders 
that customers place in different categories, we used two different approaches.  In the first approach we 
averaged all customers who placed at least two orders in the category, while in the second approach we 
restricted attention to customers who had made exactly three orders in the category.  The second 
approach was suggested by a reviewer and controls for heterogeneity in the frequency of orders across 
categories. As we would expect the two measures are highly correlated; the pair-wise correlation 
between them across the 35 categories is 0.97.   
  
In Table 6 we report the pair-wise correlation between these two measures and the response to the 
competitors’ advertising event measured by the number of units purchased during the twenty month 
Measurement Period.  We report the pair-wise correlations separately for all four return reasons. The 
key finding is that the faster the reduction in the return rate due to sizes between a customers’ first and 
last orders, the larger the response to the competitive advertising.  This is consistent with the 
explanation that customers returned to purchase from Retail World because they had learned about 
product sizes from previous purchases.  The rank-order correlation between the change in returns due 
to size and the response to the competitive advertising is even larger (0.50), indicating that the 
relationship cannot be attributed to mere outliers. 
Table 6 and Figure 3 about here 
                                                          
14 The demand depletion interpretation that motivated our analysis of the recency of customer’s prior category 
purchases is not sensitive to these size types.  For example, purchasing a size L pair of pants may deplete demand 
for size 10 pants as well as size L pants. 
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In Figure 3 we provide a scatter plot of the response to the competitors’ advertising (in each category) 
and the change in return rates due to size.  The relationship is clearly observable in this figure.  The 
figure highlights why we observe a null overall effect; the impact of the competitive advertising is 
positive in some categories and negative in others.   The figure also illustrates the magnitude of the 
interaction effect.  In particular, if we group the 35 categories into quintiles (of 7 categories each) 
according to the change in returns due to size, the mean response to the competitors’ advertising in 
each quintile is monotonically decreasing.  The first quintile (the leftmost portion of Figure 3) has the 
largest decrease in returns due to size and a mean response of 0.87%.  In contrast, this effect declines to 
-1.8% and -3.1% in quintiles 4 and 5 (the rightmost portions) which have the smallest decrease in returns 
due to size.  Importantly, this segmentation of the data clearly highlights the competing positive and 
negative effects of competitive advertising.  We do observe negative advertising effects, but these are 
limited to categories with low consumer loyalty (the reduction in returns is smallest).   Positive spillovers 
exist, but are limited to categories with high consumer loyalty (the reduction in returns is largest). 
While learning about sizes appears to play an important role in explaining the variation in the response 
to the competitive advertising, learning about the other return reasons is apparently less important. We 
do see a negative correlation between the other three return reasons and the response to the 
competitive advertising.  However, none of these correlations are statistically significant.  
Number of Prior Purchases 
Our interpretation of the change in returns measure suggests that customers who have made more 
prior purchases in the category should have learned more about products sizes.  However, we have not 
directly tested how the response to the competitive mailings varies according to the number of prior 
purchases a customer has made in a category.  Doing so requires that we overcome an important 
confound.  A customer who has made more prior purchases from Retail World in a category may be 
more loyal to Retail World for reasons other than their knowledge of sizes (to aid exposition we will 
label this “generic loyalty”).  An increase in purchases from Retail World as a result of receiving 
competitors’ advertising may just reflect this generic loyalty.   
 
To demonstrate that the relationship between prior purchases and the response to the competitive 
advertising (if any) is due to learning about sizes rather than just generic loyalty, we will again rely on a 
comparison across categories.  In particular, the generic loyalty explanation operates for every category, 
while we only expect prior purchases to contribute to learning about sizes in some categories.  If we can 
show that the relationship between prior purchases and the response to the competitor’s advertising is 
stronger in categories in which there is more learning about product sizes, we can claim that the 
relationship is attributable to customer learning rather than other sources of loyalty. 
 
We begin by constructing a measure of the rate at which customers learn about product sizes in each 
category.  In particular, for each category we estimate how the change in returns (between the first and 
last order) varies according to the total number of orders a customer has made in the category.  The 
slope of this relationship provides a measure of how quickly customers learn from previous orders.  In 
categories in which customers learn more about the firm’s products we would expect this slope to be 
more negative, so that greater learning leads to a faster reduction in returns.   For ease of exposition we 
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label this slope the “Return Trend”.15
We then construct a measure of how much we expect each customer to have learned about sizes in 
each category by multiplying this measure of the rate of learning with the number of orders that 
customers have placed in each category: 
  A large positive Return Trend indicates that customers quickly 
increase their rate of returns (across orders), while a large negative trend indicates that the rate of 
returns quickly decreases. 
 
Size Learningi,c = Return Trendc * Prior Category Ordersi,c  
 
We add this variable to the QML Poisson customer x category-level model used to estimate the recency 
interactions in the previous section.  In particular, we include both Size Learning as a main effect, and an 
interaction between Size Learning and the Treatment variable.  It is the coefficient for this Treatment 
interaction that is the coefficient of interest.  We caution that the interpretation requires care because 
this is a 3-way interaction between the Return Trend, the number of Prior Category Orders, and the 
Treatment variable.  The coefficient measures how an increase in the number of prior customer orders 
affects the response to competitors’ advertising in categories in which there is a lot of learning about 
product sizes compared to categories without a lot of learning about product sizes.     
 
Recall from our earlier discussion that Category Recency is not well-defined if a customer does not have 
a prior purchase in a category.  It was for this reason that when we investigated the Treatment * 
Category Recency interaction in the previous section we omitted these observations.  In order to retain 
Category Recency as a control in our Size Learning model we use two different approaches.   First, as in 
Section 3 we estimate the model when omitting observations for customers with no prior purchases in a 
category (Model 1).  In the second approach we include these observations and constructed a binary 
flag identifying customers with no prior purchases in a category.16
 
  We include this binary flag as both a 
main effect and interacted with the Treatment variable (Model 2).  This second approach recognizes that 
while these observations do not contribute to our understanding of the Category Recency interaction, 
they may provide insight in this model.  In particular, customers with no prior category purchases cannot 
have learned any size information from past purchases.  Our interpretation that learning about sizes 
contributes to customer loyalty suggests that the competitors’ advertising should have a smaller effect 
on purchases from Retail World for these observations. 
The findings are reported in Table 7 (we again cluster the standard errors by category).  In both models 
the coefficient for the interaction between Treatment and Size Learning is negative and highly 
significant.  This indicates that the response to the competitive advertising was higher among customers 
who had more prior experience in categories where the Return Trend is more negative.  It is consistent 
                                                          
15 In each category we use OLS to estimate the Return Trend using the separate sample of 3.6 million customers.  
We use all customers who placed at least two orders in the category.  The average sample size for these estimates 
is approximately 143,000, with a minimum of 10,000 observations in any category.    
16 Notice that in Model 1 the sample size is smaller than the sample size for the models reported in Table 4.  This 
reflects the narrower definitions of a category to focus on a single size type.  
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with the interpretation that prior purchases lead to more loyalty in categories in which customers learn 
more quickly about product sizes.   
 
Table 7 about here 
 
We also observe a negative interaction between the Treatment variable and No Prior Category Purchase.   
This is consistent with our prediction that these customers would have a less favorable response to the 
competitive advertising.  Notice that for these customers both Category Recency and Prior Category 
Units equal zero, and so the estimated net impact of the Treatment on category sales for these 
customers is -6.62% (adjusting the 3.28% main Treatment coefficient with just the -9.90% No Prior 
Category Purchase interaction coefficient).  This result highlights the mix of positive and negative 
treatment effects.  We observe a positive main effect from advertising but a negative effect among 
customers who have no history in a category.     
 
5. Conclusions 
Standard models of competition predict that firms will sell less when competitors target their customers 
with advertising.  We have presented findings that contrast with this prediction and demonstrated that 
advertising can lead to positive spillovers for other firms even in a competitive market.  We investigate 
how these positive spillovers vary across product categories.  The findings reveal that the product 
categories with the largest spillovers are the categories in which customers appear to learn about 
product attributes from prior purchases.   Detailed data on the reasons that customers return items 
allowed us to investigate what customers are learning.  We show that the rate that customers learn 
about size information is closely related to the response to the competitive advertising.  
We also investigated how the response to the competitive advertising varied according to how many 
times customers had previously purchased in a category.  We find that customers who have made more 
prior purchases were more likely to respond to the competitors’ advertising by purchasing at Retail 
World.  However, this only holds in product categories in which there is evidence that customers learn 
about product sizes from prior purchases.  This distinction is important; it suggests that the relationship 
between past purchasing and the positive spillovers can be attributed to learning about product sizes, 
rather than other generic sources of customer loyalty. 
Our findings provide unique measures of the impact of advertising in a competitive market, and we 
believe that the results have the potential to change our understanding of competition in mature 
markets.  First, we show that advertising by a competitor may increase another firm’s sales.  This result 
can be compared with previous studies of competitive advertising, which have generally focused on 
negative spillovers.  For example extensive research in the tobacco industry has studied whether 
tobacco advertising leads to brand switching or an increase in primary demand: does Marlboro 
advertising lift Marlboro sales by increasing smoking, or by switching smokers from Rothmans to 
Marlboro?  Few empirical studies anticipate the possibility of positive spillovers from competitors’ 
advertising, such as a positive impact of Marlboro advertising on sales of Rothmans.     
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Second, the findings highlight the role of product standards.  Our evidence that customers can use past 
experience to learn about product sizes does not extend to all categories.  Instead it is limited to 
categories in which product sizes are standardized within a brand but not across brands.   This may help 
to explain why firms do not adopt common standards in industries where doing so would offer obvious 
customer benefits.  The customer benefits are particularly true in the apparel market.  It is estimated 
that 70% to 80% of apparel products may not meet customers’ size expectations, and this contributes to 
50% of women and 62% of men not being able to find products that fit (Abend 1993 and DesMarteau 
2000).   The outcome is not just lost sales but a large volume of returns.   At the apparel retailer that 
provided data for this study an average of 10.6% of purchases are returned.  This increases to over 20% 
for swimwear, imposing a monetary cost in managing logistics and depreciation of the returned items, 
and possibly also an intangible cost due to customer dissatisfaction.  
Our findings may also extend our understanding of the role of switching costs.  Learning about product 
fit is relatively easy, returning requires only nominal effort, and this effort is only incurred if the product 
does not fit.  Yet in a mature market with many close competitors we provide evidence that these 
switching costs are sufficient to greatly reduce the threat from competition.   
Finally, the findings also offer guidance to retailers.  When selecting which customers to make available 
in rented mailing lists or cooperative advertising events retailers should focus on (1) customers who 
have not purchased recently, and (2) customers who have made repeat purchases in categories where 
learning about sizes is important (such as footwear).  We caution that this does not imply that these are 
also the best types of customers to request when mailing to a competitors’ customers.  This answer 
obviously depends upon sales at the competing firms (which we do not observe).  Because the 
competing firms do observe these outcomes, the evidence that they tend to choose customers who 
have purchased from Retail World most recently and most frequently, suggests that it is the more 
recent and more frequent purchasers that a competitor should request.  
Our results also call for future research on the role of advertising with consumer switching costs.  We 
argue that positive spillovers may arise when competitors’ advertising reminds consumers about a 
primary need for a category that is later fulfilled at a preferred retailer.  More research is required to 
understand this mechanism and the implications for advertising competition. 
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Table 1.  Average Sales at Retail World: All Customers 
 Treatment Condition 
Control   
Condition Difference 
Measurement Period     
Units Purchased 7.67                 
(0.03) 
7.66                 
(0.03) 
0.01                  
(0.05) 
Total Revenue  $260.61          
($1.10) 
$260.59         
($1.15) 
$0.02      
($1.59) 
Historical Sales    
Units Purchased 33.56                       
(0.14) 
33.54                     
(0.14) 
0.02                 
(0.19) 
Total Revenue  $1,276.17                
($5.04) 
$1,277.02                 
($5.40) 
-$0.85      
($7.39) 
Sample Size 184,455 184,625  
The table reports the averages for each Retail World sales measure in the Treatment and Control 
Conditions.  The outcomes are calculated using the entire twenty-month Measurement Period.  
The Historical Sales measures are calculated using the customers’ entire transaction histories 
prior to the start of the treatment.   Standard errors are in parentheses.  *Significantly different 
from zero, p < 0.05, **significantly different from zero, p < 0.01. 
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Table 2.  Difference in Sales Between Experimental Conditions 
by Timing of Customers’ Prior Purchases 
 Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3  
 0 to 4 months 4 to 8 months 8 to 12 months 
Measurement Period    
Units Purchased -0.40%               
(0.87%) 
0.21%               
(0.83%) 
5.30%**               
(1.94%) 
Total Revenue -0.53%               
(0.86%) 
-0.04%               
(0.83%) 
5.88%**      
(1.93%) 
Historical Sales    
Units Purchased -0.10%               
(0.84%) 
0.04%               
(0.76%) 
1.73%               
(1.51%) 
Total Revenue -0.10%               
(0.85%) 
-0.20%               
(0.75%) 
1.19%               
(1.57%) 
Sample Size 135,480 187,538 46,062 
The table describes the difference in the average sales measures between the Treatment and 
Control conditions (as a percentage of sales in the Control condition).  Positive (negative) values 
indicate customers in the Treatment condition placed more (less) orders on average.  The 
outcomes are calculated using the entire twenty-month Measurement Period.  The Historical 
Sales measures are calculated using the customers’ entire transaction histories prior to the start 
of the treatment.   Standard errors are in parentheses.  *Significantly different from zero, p < 
0.05, **significantly different from zero, p < 0.01. 
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Table 3.  The Recency Interaction Estimated at the Customer Level  
 Model 1 Model 2   Model 3 
Treatment -1.72%         
(1.00%) 
1.32%         
(1.91%) 
 
Treatment x Recency (100s days) 1.73%**         
(0.61%) 
1.61%*         
(0.72%) 
 
Recency (100s days) -55.12%**                   
(0.43%) 
-31.59%**                   
(0.51%) 
 
Treatment x Segment 1   2.53%         
(1.93%) 
Treatment x Segment 2   3.75%*         
(1.50%) 
Treatment x Segment 3   7.12%**         
(2.38%) 
Segment 2   -39.62%**         
(0.91%) 
Segment 3   -72.96%**         
(1.39%) 
Treatment x Prior Total Units (100s)  -3.97%         
(3.84%) 
-4.42%         
(3.82%) 
Prior Total Units (100s)  364.20%**                   
(2.74) 
371.46%**                   
(2.72) 
Age (years)  -0.24%**         
(0.02%) 
-0.25%**         
(0.02%) 
Estimated Household Income ($10,000s)  0.57%**                   
(0.04%) 
0.57%**                   
(0.04%) 
Female Head of Household  7.61%**                   
(0.56%) 
7.67%**                   
(0.56%) 
Married Head of Household  4.95%**                   
(0.56%) 
5.03%**                   
(0.56%) 
Number of Kids  -0.10%                   
(0.31%) 
-0.11%                   
(0.32%) 
Log Likelihood -1,041,263 -989,125 -989,496 
Sample Size  369,080 369,080 369,080 
The table reports coefficient from a negative binomial model estimated at the customer level, where 
the dependent variable measures the number of units purchased in the Measurement Period by 
customer i.  Estimated coefficients that are omitted from Models 2 and 3 include the controls for 
seasonality (and their interactions with the Treatment), and the binary flags identifying missing 
demographic data.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.  Recency Interaction Estimated at the Customer x Category-Level  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Treatment -1.64%         
(1.90%) 
-2.53%         
(1.91%) 
-6.26%**         
(2.30%) 
-1.55%         
(1.91%) 
-0.99%         
(0.63%) 
Treatment * Category Recency (100s days) 0.33%**         
(0.07%) 
 0.30%**         
(0.06%) 
  
Category Recency (100s days) -6.37%**                   
(0.49%) 
 -5.86%**                   
(0.41%) 
  
Treatment * Log Category Recency   2.72%**         
(0.43%) 
   
Log Category Recency   -34.28%**                   
(0.98%) 
   
Treatment * Intervals Since Last Purchase    2.01%**         
(0.43%) 
 
Intervals Since Last Purchase    -41.24%**         
(1.77%) 
 
Treatment * 1-2 Intervals      2.86%**         
(1.04%) 
Treatment * 2 Intervals or more     5.85%**         
(0.98%) 
1-2 Intervals     -63.54%**                   
(3.71%) 
2 Intervals or more     -127.13%**                   
(6.40%) 
Treatment * Category Recency (100s days)   4.84%**         
(0.55%) 
  
Recency (100s days)   -39.63%**         
(2.02%) 
  
Treatment * Prior Category Units 0.62%**         
(0.05%) 
0.57%**         
(0.06%) 
0.59%**         
(0.05%) 
0.62%**         
(0.05%) 
0.63%**         
(0.05%) 
Prior Category Units 0.46%**                   
(0.04%) 
0.44%**         
(0.04%) 
0.44%**         
(0.04%) 
0.46%**         
(0.04%) 
0.46%**         
(0.04%) 
Age (years) 0.20%**         
(0.05%) 
0.16%**         
(0.05%) 
0.18%**         
(0.05%) 
0.20%**         
(0.05%) 
0.18%**         
(0.05%) 
Estimated Household Income ($10,000s) 0.42%**                   
(0.06%) 
0.39%**                   
(0.06%) 
0.39%**                   
(0.07%) 
0.43%**                   
(0.06%) 
0.42%**                   
(0.06%) 
Female Head of Household 2.72%                   
(10.60%) 
2.76%                   
(10.04%) 
1.77%                   
(11.22%) 
2.37%                   
(10.41%) 
2.54%                   
(10.88%) 
Married Head of Household 3.43%*                   
(1.68%) 
3.34%                   
(1.87%) 
1.93%                   
(1.82%) 
3.48%*                   
(1.67%) 
3.55%*                   
(1.68%) 
Number of Kids -2.88%                   
(2.31%) 
-2.40%                   
(2.36%) 
-2.85%                   
(2.41%) 
-2.85%                   
(2.29%) 
-2.76%                   
(2.34%) 
Log Likelihood -3,089,978 -3,079,526 -3,031,000 -3,080,093 -3,103,969 
Sample Size  2,214,658 2,214,658 2,214,658 2,214,658 2,214,658 
The table reports coefficients from quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson models with (conditional) fixed product category 
effects.  The dependent variable measures the number of units of category c purchased in the Measurement Period by 
customer i.  Estimated coefficients that are omitted from Models 2 through 5 include the controls for seasonality (and 
their interactions with the Treatment), and the binary flags identifying missing demographic data.  The standard errors 
are clustered by category and reported in parentheses.    
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Table 5.  Return Reasons: Summary Statistics 
Return Reason % Return Reason % 
Did Not Like The Item  Defective  
Did Not Like Color 6.6% Defective Construction 2.7% 
Did Not Like Material 4.4% Care Instructions Failed 0.6% 
Did Not Like Styling 12.3% Shipping Damage 0.2% 
Did Not Perform As Expected 2.4%   
Finish Unacceptable 0.2% Miscellaneous  
Not As Described 0.5% Miscellaneous 19.2% 
Not As Pictured 1.1% Difficult To Assemble 0.1% 
Quality Unsatisfactory 1.5% Price Too High 0.5% 
  Wrong Item Shipped 1.5% 
Item was the Wrong Size    
Ordered Wrong Size 2.8% Total 100% 
Too Large 22.1%   
Too Small 21.7%   
The table describes the frequency with which each return reason appears in the 
transaction data for the separate sample of 3.6 million customers. 
   
 
Table 6.  Change in the Return Rate and the Response to the Competitive Advertising 
 Wrong Size Did Not Like the Item Defect Other 
Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients     
3 category orders -0.38* -0.01 -0.24 -0.20 
All customers with at 
least 2 category orders -0.41*
 -0.01 -0.22 -0.09 
The table reports the pair-wise correlation between the response to the competitive advertising and 
both the Change in Return Rate.  The Change in Return Rate is estimated using the separate sample 
of 3.6 million customers.  The response to the competitive advertising measures the % difference in 
units purchased in each category by customers in the Treatment and Control conditions.  The sample 
size for each correlation is 35 (categories). *Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05, **significantly 
different from zero, p < 0.01. 
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Table 7.  Size Learning Interactions                                                   
Estimated at the Customer x Category-Level  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Treatment -4.54%*         
(1.91%) 
3.28%**         
(1.10%) 
Treatment * Size Learning  -5.60%**         
(1.53%) 
-5.29%**         
(1.38%) 
Size Learning -5.14%**         
(0.67%) 
-5.10%**         
(0.68%) 
Treatment * No Prior Category Purchase  -9.90%**         
(1.25%) 
No Prior Category Purchase  243.70%**         
(11.15%) 
Treatment * Category Recency (100s days) 0.39%**         
(0.05%) 
0.38%**         
(0.06%) 
Category Recency (100s days) -6.08%**         
(0.49%) 
-5.95%**         
(0.49%) 
Treatment * Prior Category Units 0.39%**         
(0.05%) 
0.41%**         
(0.05%) 
Prior Category Units 0.38%**         
(0.04%) 
0.38%**         
(0.04%) 
Age (00s years) 0.18%**         
(0.05%) 
0.06%         
(0.09%) 
Estimated Household Income ($10,000s) 0.45%**                   
(0.05%) 
0.56%**                   
(0.05%) 
Female Head of Household 3.28%                   
(10.67%) 
7.00%                   
(10.13%) 
Married Head of Household 3.46%                   
(1.78%) 
5.94%**                   
(1.87%) 
Number of Kids -2.68%                   
(2.52%) 
-0.34%                   
(2.89%) 
Log Likelihood -2,798,281 -5,175,369 
Sample Size  2,127,691 12,917,800 
The table reports coefficients from a quasi-maximum likelihood Poisson model with 
(conditional) fixed product category effects.  The dependent variable measures the 
number of units of category c purchased in the Measurement Period by customer i.  
Estimated coefficients that are omitted from the table include the controls for 
seasonality (and their interactions with the Treatment), and the binary flags 
identifying missing demographic data.  The standard errors are clustered by 
category and reported in parentheses.    
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Figure 1.  Change in Return Rates in Categories With / Without Item Sizes 
 
The figure reports the average change in the return rates in categories with / without item sizes.  The change in 
the return rates is measured as the difference in the return rates on a customer’s first and last order in the 
category. The unit of analysis is a category x customer and the sample includes all customers who placed at each 
two orders in a category.  The sample sizes are 5,160,972 for items with sizes and 1,245,168 for items without 
sizes.  The differences in the two averages are statistically significant (p<0.01) for all four return reasons.  
 
Figure 2.  Change in Return Rates in Childrens’ vs. Other Categories 
 
The figure reports the average change in the return rates in Childrens’ categories vs. Other categories.  The 
change in the return rates is measured as the difference in the return rates on a customer’s first and last order in 
the category. The unit of analysis is a category x customer and the sample includes all customers who placed at 
each two orders in a category.  The sample sizes are 429,128 for the Childrens’ categories and 4,731,844 for the 
other categories.  The differences in the two averages are statistically significant (p<0.01) for all four return 
reasons.  
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Figure 3.  The Response to the Competitive Advertising by Category  
 and the Change in the Rate of Size Returns  
 
The y-axis measures the percentage difference in the average number of units purchased in each 
category by customers in the Treatment and Control conditions.  Positive (negative) values indicate 
customers in the Treatment condition ordered more (less) units on average.   The x-axis measures the 
change in return rates between customers first and last orders in the category.  The measure for each 
category is averaged across customers who had placed at least 2 orders in the category using the 
separate sample of 3.6 million customers.  The figure includes a linear trend line. 
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Appendix Table A1.  Examples of Mailing Requests 
 Request 20 Request 21 Request 22 
Company  K P AJ 
Request Date 2/20/06 2/9/06 3/13/06 
Mail Date 3/25/06 3/28/06 4/2/06 
Mailing Piece Spring 2006 catalog Spring preview catalog March catalog 
Selection Criteria Customers who spent 
$100 or more dollars in 
the last 6 months from the 
childrens’ catalogs. 
Exclude previously used 
customers. 
Female customers who 
spent $75 or more since 
November 2005 on 
women’s’ apparel 
products 
 
Female customers who 
live in mid-West states 
and purchased products 
other than apparel in the 
last three months. 
Number Ordered 28,867 20,000 44,600 
Number Mailed 25,905 20,000 42,011 
These examples are disguised to protect confidentiality. 
 
In the first example (Request Number 20), on February 2, 2006 Company K asked for its Spring 2006 
catalog to be sent to 28,867 customers who had spent $100 or more in the last six-months on items 
from Retail World’s childrens’ catalogs.  Company K also specified that any customers included in 
previous requests were to be excluded.  The third-party is responsible for both identifying the qualifying 
customers and fulfilling the mailing request.  In this case the third-party firm found 25,905 of Retail 
World’s customers that qualified under these criteria and organized for Company K’s Spring 2006 
catalog to be mailed to these customers on March 25, 2006.  Company K never receives the actual 
names of the customers who were mailed.  Because the 25,905 customers believe that they were mailed 
a catalog directly by Company K, any orders they place are made directly with this company.   
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Appendix Table A2.  Competitors’ Mailing Request Criteria 
 Frequency Percentage of Requests 
Recency: Time Since Last Purchase   
Less than 3 months 96 32% 
Less than 6 months 54 18% 
Within 7 to 12 months  27 9% 
Specific months 68 23% 
Any recency criterion  262 87% 
Amount Spent   
Over $50 36 12% 
Over $75 46 15% 
Over $100 83 28% 
Over $150 62 21% 
Any amount spent criterion 240 80% 
Other Criteria   
Purchasers from a specific catalog-type 150 50% 
Purchases from a specific category 128 43% 
Customer gender 112 37% 
Specific zip codes 50 17% 
Sample Size   
Total number of mailing requests 301  
This table summarizes the criteria used in the 301 mailing requests from competitors.  
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Appendix Table A3.  Eligible Mailing Requests 
by Customers’ Historical Purchases From the Retail World 
 Average Number                                  of Eligible Requests Sample Size 
Recency: Time Since Last Order   
Less than 4 months 50.0 135,480 
4 to 8 months 28.3 187,538 
8 to 12 months 8.2 46,062 
Frequency: Number of Prior Orders   
1 to 3 prior purchases 20.4 137,040 
4 to 6 prior purchases 28.5 55,877 
7 to 12 prior purchases 34.5 66,554 
13 or more prior purchases 52.7 109,609 
Average Order Size   
0 to $50 16.4 86,602 
$50 to $75 21.9 44,923 
$75 to $100 25.7 41,155 
Over $100 45.8 196,400 
This table summarizes the estimated number of competitors’ mailing requests (out of a 
total of 301) that each customer was eligible for.  Customers are grouped according to 
their historical purchases from Retail World.  We restricted attention to transactions that 
occurred prior to the start of the competitive advertising event. 
 
